in Bermuda 1977-1981'. A new book by Allison Moir.

Towards the end of Allison Moir's new book, Partners in Peace & Prosperity -- A Premier and a Governor in Bermuda 1977-1981 (Xlibris Corporation, 2000) there is a short account of the terrible fuss that ensued when Sir Peter Ramsbotham suggested, just before he left Bermuda, that some good might have come of the riots that occurred in 1977, when convicted murderers Larry Tacklyn and Buck Burrows were executed.

Sir Peter's chief detractor was then-Member of Parliament, Harry Viera. Mr.

Viera's point was not that what Sir Peter said wasn't true -- a child could have seen that it was -- but that by saying so, the Governor was encouraging people to "make change outside the democratic process''...to go and have another riot, in other words.

Mr Viera surely suffered from a malaise that was, at that time, widespread among both whites and blacks -- each had a profoundly one-dimensional view of the other.

Deep down, many white Bermudians thought black Bermudians, no matter how reassuring the veneer of civilisation they had managed to acquire, had a propensity for crime and violence. Deep down, many black Bermudians thought white Bermudians, no matter how reassuring the veneer of civilisation they had managed to acquire, had a propensity for bigotry and conspiracy.

And, no less significant for Bermuda, deep down, many of the British expatriates in the country thought of Bermudians no differently than they did other Colonials -- they were not to be trusted wholeheartedly.

This book describes events in Bermuda's history that were a watershed, the equivalent of a social earthquake measuring somewhere near the top of the Richter scale. It chronicles the efforts of two people, in particular, who were able to bring about a short period of intense change, a period during which, among other things, blacks and whites began to be able to see each other in three dimensions.

That perhaps is significant enough on its own to justify using the word watershed, but in fact, much more had changed by 1981 than the simple passage of four years would suggest was likely.

It was a period during which there was significant Constitutional change. It was a period during which the Governor became less powerful and the Premier more powerful. It was a period during which Bermuda laid the groundwork for the subsequent explosion of insurance and reinsurance businesses setting up here. It was a period during which Bermuda gained for itself the right to often represent its own interests abroad. In short, it was a period during which Bermuda ceased to be the little backwater of the British Empire that it once had been, and developed a personality and a presence of its own on the world stage.

It must be terribly easy, in writing a book like this one, commissioned and, presumably, paid for by the subjects, to fall into the trap of praising overmuch. But this is not an attempt to makes saints of sinners -- Sir Peter and Sir David are shown in a light with which few will quibble. Most of the material is well established as fact, but even when it is being offered up for public scrutiny for the first time, it has the ring of truth about it.

Sir Peter Ramsbotham had had a distinguished diplomatic career before he came to Bermuda, capped by a stint as British Ambassador in Washington. He is a charming and talented man who became, probably, the most popular Governor in living memory.

Sir David Gibbons is extraordinary in his own, rather different way. One former Cabinet Minister is quoted in the book as describing him as a "cold fish''. To the extent that suggests a disdain for other people, it is a mis-characterisation. Sir David's distance seems to have more to do with a touch of shyness and preoccupation than anything else. He was always perfectly candid about the fact that he was not cut out for the kissing-babies style of politics. That candour (as well as the charm of his wife, Lully) saved his political career from dying under the weight of his awkwardness with people.

In any event, all Bermudians like successful moneymen, and as a moneyman, he is without peer in Bermuda.

Ms Moir's book tells the story of the interaction between these two men after the 1977 riots, an interaction that was the catalyst for the rapid progress Bermuda made in a variety of areas.

Ms Moir has been able to light up some long-forgotten corners of that progress, and to illuminate detail in those corners that has never been revealed before. For example, there is a fascinating chapter on the birth in Bermuda of political polling; another on the writing of the Insurance Act of 1978, a unique piece of legislation copied by other jurisdictions all over the world; another on how and why Sir David sought to be able to represent Bermuda's interests in other countries.

For the book's tone of legitimacy, and for its straightforward, workmanlike writing, praise is due the author, who is a New Yorker, a former managing editor of Forbes FYI now writing commissioned biographies like this one for a living. It must also be due to those who kept her on the straight and narrow -- she particularly mentions, in her acknowledgements, David Garth, a political consultant for the UBP in the post-1977 period, and David L. White, the former editor of The Royal Gazette .

The reader must also be grateful to those who helped Ms Moir by agreeing to be interviewed. There do not seem to have been a great many of them, but there were sufficient to allow a picture to emerge. The author mentions one notable exception, Sir John Swan, who declined to be interviewed. He was not a major player on this particular stage, so perhaps no great contribution was lost. He and Sir David are not known to be the closest of friends, but it still seems curious and rather churlish for the man who succeeded Sir David as Premier to decline to add to our understanding of an important period in our history.

That this is a praiseworthy and interesting book, however, does not mean that it should be taken either as a complete social history of the period or as unfailingly accurate in its presentation of the facts.

The riots of 1977 were certainly the most violent sign of unrest in Bermuda society, but they were by no means the only sign. The United Bermuda Party itself was roiled by discontent. The emergence of the Black Caucus in the earlier part of the decade certainly caused a stir, but open revolt against Sir David's predecessor, Premier Jack (later Sir John) Sharpe created an anarchic atmosphere within the UBP that lasted throughout the Gibbons years.

We can now see, with the benefit of hindsight, that this was the beginning of a very long death throe, one perhaps not yet quite ended.

A corollary of that political struggle was a Wild West atmosphere in the Press, as leak after leak, most of them from politicians trying to advance one cause or another, dominated the headlines of the day. Sir David Gibbons must have felt at times like a man riding on the back of a tiger. Once, apparently in desperation, he tried to instruct the local Press never again to call his Ministers for comment on stories. All comment, he said, would thenceforth come from the Government spokesman. The Press, of course, took no notice, and the leaks went on.

The book does not advance our knowledge in another important area -- why was so much damage done by the rioters? Why was the response to rioting so poor? After all, the hangings were like a juggernaut lumbering slowly towards us for months before they occurred, so it is not as if there wasn't time to prepare.

And after all, other nations deal successfully with outbreaks of civil disobedience with great regularity, as matters of no particular difficulty.

It seems obvious that the failure must have been in the planning. Indeed, it was almost as if no-one expected there to be trouble at all, and hadn't really bothered to place resources where they might be most useful, or to arrange for reinforcements in the event the resources proved not to be sufficient.

Why that should have been so is something of a mystery.

Sir Peter told Allison Moir that the Bermuda Regiment was not fully used because the soldiers had not had the proper training. That is not correct. The Pitt Commission accepted the Regiment had been properly trained, and said they should have been used. The only explanation that makes any sense for the failure of Government House to use them properly is the one Police Deputy Commissioner Alf Morris rather disingenuously gave the Pitt Commission. He said he didn't trust them.

Ms Moir begins her book, perhaps a little melodramatically, by describing a late-night call in November, 1977, by Sir Peter on the Premier at his home.

Sir Peter went there to announce that the British Foreign Secretary, then Dr.

David Owen, had declined to exercise his right to advise the Queen to commute the death sentences given to Burrows and Tacklyn. Ms Moir asserts that to both men, this was surprising and disappointing news.

Ms Moir quotes Sir Peter as saying he had been "badly advised'' on the subject of commutation by the Labour Government. On the strength of what he had first been led to believe, he had told Sir David Gibbons that the sentences were likely to be commuted. But, Sir Peter said, for two months... right back almost to the date of his arrival in Bermuda...the British Foreign Office had known the sentences would not be commuted, and had failed to tell him.

It is hard to believe that the country that created the Empire Upon Which the Sun Never Set could be quite so obtuse as this.

In fact, Sir Peter's version of events, with its suggestion of inefficiency on the part of the Foreign Office, whose Foreign Secretary, Dr Owen, he also blames for unfairly removing him from his post as British Ambassador in Washington, seems to conflict with what was published at the time.

In a statement made to the British Parliament a day or so after rioting in Bermuda came to an end, Dr. Owen said this: "...the Bermuda Prerogative of Mercy Committee advised that neither Burrows nor Tacklyn should be reprieved, and the then Acting Governor (this was Peter Lloyd, who reverted to the office of Deputy Governor when Sir Peter Ramsbotham arrived in Bermuda) decided to accept the Committee's advice...

"Meanwhile, a petition for clemency to Her Majesty on behalf of both men, signed by approximately 6,000 Bermudians, had been received. I referred the matter to the new Governor, who carefully considered the matters raised in the petition. The Prerogative of Mercy Committee again advised against a reprieve and he (Sir Peter, that is) decided that there were no grounds for changing the decision of the Acting Governor." Furthermore, once the date of the hangings had been set, said Mr Owen, "the Governor, who is responsible to the British Government for Bermuda's internal security, consulted the Premier and Bermuda Ministers, who are responsible for all other aspects of internal affairs, on whether a stay of execution should be granted because of possible reaction to the executions. They advised the Governor that racial harmony, respect for law and order, and the security situation, would suffer more if a stay of execution were granted.'' That was not exactly the most penetrating insight the Bermuda Government has ever had. But Dr Owen's words do seem to show that the Governor and the Bermuda Government were fully aware of what was going on in Britain.

One hesitates to speculate that the Governor and the Bermuda Government might have been playing a game of brinkmanship, showing a tough face to Bermudians and to the world, but all the time thinking the British Government would step in at the last minute and save them from themselves. With the lives of two men and the stability of the country at stake, that would seem an extraordinarily foolhardy game to play.

But if that was not what was going on, why should Sir Peter express such astonishment in this volume that the British Government, in the end, declined to step in? Why should Bermuda appear to have been caught by surprise at the last minute, unprepared for what happened? Fascinating though it might be, this little mystery is, nonetheless, slightly off the point, and it is surely unfair to expect the author of a commissioned biography to probe such matters too deeply.

Ms Moir's volume does add to our knowledge of an important period in our history. It is an important addition to the Bermuda canon and must, therefore, be required reading for any student of Bermuda's recent history.

Tough times: Sir Peter Ramsbotham A place in history: Sir David Gibbons