Trying to have it both ways

Dear Sir,

In my letter of October 10, I argued towards two conclusions about morality that must be drawn by logical necessity if the premise that a purely naturalistic account of moral values and duties is true. First, I showed that if God does not exist, then objective moral values cannot exist. As atheist biologist Michael Ruse writes, "morality is a collective illusion foisted upon us by our genes". Second, I echoed atheist philosopher Thomas Hobbes' deduction that if all human thought and action is reducible to material processes occurring within the body, then human beings cannot possess free will. Any naturalistic justification for moral accountability is thus contradicted by the fact that human beings are quite literally slaves to their genes.

In his letter of response (October 27) 'Taciturnus' misrepresented my first argument when he wrote: "In seeking to assert Mr. Notman's belief in God, he would have us believe that we cannot justifiably hold a true sense of moral obligation..."

In seeking to assert his disbelief in a transcendent source of objective moral truth, Taciturnus has ignored the distinction I made between objective and subjective moral truths. I defined an objective moral truth as one that would be capable of binding individuals irrespective of their belief in its truth value. For example, to say that the Holocaust was an objectively immoral event, would mean that it would still be immoral even if the Nazis had won the war and killed anyone who opposed them and brainwashed the rest of society into believing that the Holocaust was a morally good event. The vast majority of atheistic moral philosophers agree that if God does not exist, then objective moral values cannot exist. I suggest that Taciturnus agrees with this argument since he takes the view that morality has evolved, "... over centuries of mankind forming colonies to protect and defend and survive, and yes, prosper, materially."

That however, leaves him with only subjective moral values which, as I wrote last time, are merely a collection of cultural and socio-biological pressures converging on the individual. Taciturnus seems content with this explanation of morality, for he believes that whilst we may have a way to go yet, "each step we take forges a deepening understanding of who we are and of what dreams, what personal sacrifices, what achievements, what compassion, and of what morality we are capable. And yes, of course, of what horrors we are capable."

How ironic then, for Taciturnus to credit Charles Darwin for providing a "milestone in mankind's moral progress." Darwin's contribution to the equivocal term 'evolution', which until the publication of his work meant simply 'change over time' was the hypothesis that this change was unguided, random and purposeless. Taciturnus' optimistic faith in a naturalistic progression from mankind "bellowing and beating our breasts" to some future, objectively true moral plane of human existence through the process of Darwinian evolution demonstrates that he does not understand that such a progression is fundamentally antithetical to the Darwinian hypothesis.

Darwinism makes no distinction between what 'is' moral and what 'ought' to be moral because 'ought' implies purpose and therefore, design. Darwin himself, though in many ways a very good man, understood that his theory demanded that every moral standard throughout history is no more or less 'good' than any other because there can be no objective standard by which to compare it. Taciturnus is beating the same drum as Chris Hitchens in declaring his moral outrage against what he believes to be the "adverse judgment of a fearsome deity", whilst holding to a philosophical worldview that specifically denies the existence of an objective standard from which to evaluate moral action. He is trying to have it both ways by believing that we are evolving towards a more moral state of development, but by means of an evolutionary process that cannot acknowledge moral development in either direction. This is specifically why I conclude my last letter by saying the naturalist is consigned to a world of make-believe moral values and freedoms in the face of certain nihilism.

Taciturnus writes that we have a "better chance of dealing with our shortcomings if we hold ourselves accountable." Yet he makes no attempt to refute my second argument, that Man is no more than a complex machine with no genuine free will and thus can be held no more morally accountable for his actions if he enjoys killing kittens instead of petting them. Either way, Man is simply doing what the material processes that compose his body compel him to do. How is it then that some complex meat machines get to determine that other complex meat machines have shortcomings for which they 'ought' to be held morally accountable, given that all are slaves to their genes? Since reductive determinism is consistent with naturalism being true, Taciturnus must be able to provide a rationale for moral accountability when all human action is reduced to material processes governed by the same laws that produce rain showers and belly button lint.

He thus failed to address the philosophical problems I raised against naturalism. Of course, even if Taciturnus were to somehow defeat Christianity with a fatal stab of rhetoric, that still would not make naturalism necessarily true as there are other religious worldviews that make claims to truth that are fundamentally different from those of Christian theism, but are also antagonistic towards pure naturalism. Taciturnus cited nothing to applaud in religion, but much to condemn it, particularly Christianity. Whilst choosing only to cite instances of Christians failing to live up to their system of beliefs may win him points among those favourable to his view, it is as specious as claiming Christianity is true because some Christians live good and righteous lives. Human evil confirms the Christian doctrine of the depraved nature of Man, which according to The Federalist Papers, was accepted by the Founding Fathers when drafting the American Constitution.

In addition to the Constitution, bear in mind also that Rosa Parks, Rev. (Taciturnus failed to include the Rev. title) Dr. Martin Luther King, William Wilberforce and Dietrich Bonhoeffer have something else in common besides being hailed by Taciturnus as milestones of moral progress. They were also profoundly devout Christians whose work to defeat the evils of oppression and intolerance was inspired by their belief in and devotion to a God whom Taciturnus apparently thinks is a moral monster that thankfully does not exist.

Perhaps however, Taciturnus, you might now be persuaded to follow the examples of these great moral teachers and seek the transcendent source of all Moral Good through the person of Jesus Christ? You are always welcome at His table and at my own, with a glass of single malt in hand, as we attempt to solve the problems of the world together.

STEPHEN NOTMAN

www.psalmtrees.org