The Boundaries Commission may have done the best job it could under its remit, but there are still plenty of questions left unanswered by its report.

Chief among them is the issue of how electoral boundaries, specifically, and Constitutional change, generally, should be dealt with in the future.

The tradition of holding constitutional conferences for major changes, as occurred in London in 1966 and at Warwick Camp in 1979, while Parliament dealt with more minor alterations, as with Sir Edward Richards' changes in the early 1970s and Sir John Swan's in the 1980s, was turned on its head in the last 12 months when Government rejected the idea of a constitutional conference for the indisputably massive changes which will now be debated on October 11.

This is a case where the end does not justify the means, and the precedent set by the current Government for constitutional change is a dangerous one, because it would permit changes to all areas of the Constitution on, effectively, a simple majority decision of the House of Assembly.

In the last 12 months, that meant that a truly meaningful debate on the best and most representative election system for Bermuda never took place. The Government, with a majority in the House, could instruct the Boundaries Commission on what form of electoral system it had to revise. Ideas like an independent speaker, not to mention proportional representation, could not be considered under its remit.

It now seems unlikely that the British Government will authorise a Constitutional conference to ratify the changes proposed by the Boundaries Commission, in spite of its statements in London that a conference or further consultation are neither ruled in nor ruled out. Thus the precedent for changing the Constitution with a minimum of debate and public consultation has been set.

Few would agree that it is good precedent, and it is one the Progressive Labour Party may rue if it ever finds itself in Opposition again, just as the United Bermuda Party no doubt is now rueing its own lack of movement on electoral reform while it was in government.

Lack of consultation between the parties and between politicians and the public, the lack of openness in the whole affair by the Commission itself, and the labyrinthine process of House debates, Boundaries Commission reports and repeated Orders in Council all suggest that there must be a better way.

There is. The Constitution could have a mechanism for changing the Constitution contained within the document itself.

Then, when changes to the Constitution are being considered, the House of Assembly could be required to vote to schedule a conference where all issues could be hammered out.

The conference could then hold open hearings to debate the changes proposed and the appropriate language of proposed amendments. Time frames, qualification for attendance at the conference and so on could be set down in the legislation. Finally, the changes could be put to a referendum which could be held either at the same time as a General Election or separately.

Again, decisions on what level of support for changes is needed could be set in the Constitution; a simple majority, a majority of all eligible voters, or an even higher level of support than either of those approaches.

Then Britain, having already participated in the Constitutional conference, would have to decide whether to enact the changes via an Order in Council.

As much as anything, problems with the process have contributed much of the heat to the current constitutional debate.

Having a set arrangement for constitutional change would allow politicians and the public to debate the actual issues and not the way the changes are being made - and that, surely, is the most important thing.