February 11, 2014

Dear Sir,

I applaud the pressure group calling for the OBA to revert to their original position of having a national referendum on gambling/casinos.

The group’s claim that a referendum on gambling is essential for the public to make an informed decision on the matter is ideal but I’m highly doubtful about a petition having the desired impact, no matter how many thousands of signatures are obtained.

For one, having a national referendum does not necessarily mean that all facts will be revealed. It’s pretty clear to the casual observer that the present government is keen to introduce legalised gambling to Bermuda so in that case it would be naive to expect the government to bring forth information that would be detrimental to their aim.

I expect that even if a national referendum was held the OBA’s position will be based on what it sees as the positive aspects of introducing legalised gambling. Negatives will be ignored, trivialised in comparison to the positives or mitigated through some other action on the part of government.

Any negative information will have to be brought up by outside groups who, despite their ideals, may not have the resources at their disposal, to influence.

And that is what this whole issue is about — being able to influence the policies of the state.

The political scientist Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, in his book the “Dictator’s Handbook” writes that political leaders, and leaders in general, lump individuals into three categories of influence:

1. The nominal selectorate — in a democracy this is the general voting public. Despite being able to vote they are actually the least influential. They are also known as ‘interchangeables’.

2. The real selectorate — a group in the nominal selectorate that

has some influence in decision making. Think elected representatives and government appointees. They are also known as ‘influentials’.

3. The winning coalition — the smallest group without whom the

political leader would be unable to lead. Think party financiers, senior party and cabinet members. They are also known as ‘essentials’.

Bueno de Mesquita argues quite reasonably that this view is true for democrats, dictators, monarchs and even CEOs. The only difference being the size of the winning coalition and real selectorate. In democracies the real selectorate and winning coalition tends to be much larger than in dictatorships.

The main point behind Bueno de Mesquita’s theory is that public policy is impacted or decided primarily by the winning coalition as they are the most influential. So whatever public policy is introduced by the government, e.g. legalised gambling, work permit revisions, is not simply because the government wants to introduce it as no leader or party can act simply do what it wants. But rather, such policies are introduced because the winning coalition wants them to be introduced. The winning coalition like the rest of humanity wants what is advantageous to them. It can be reasonably deduced that introducing legalised gambling will be financially beneficial to the winning coalition.

With this in mind, it becomes a little clearer why the OBA leader would reverse his national referendum position. Opening up the decision to the nominal selectorate, while ideal and arguably better for the country, increases the probability that the outcome may not be to the advantage of the winning coalition.

As any good political leader does, he must tip the balance in favour of the winning coalition, i.e. by having it decided in parliament (the real selectorate) where there is an OBA advantage. To do otherwise would run the risk of losing his position to someone else who will do as the winning coalition wants. That’s the nature of politics.

This theory is not meant to bring any political leader into disrepute, let’s face it, breaking electoral promises do that; instead it’s only to inform the public of a political science theory on how decisions are made and who influences them.

Bermuda’s democracy, theoretically means that the real selectorate is relatively large and overlaps into the winning coalition. So any political leader will have to stretch state resources among a wider group to buy their allegiance. This means a little less for everyone influential.

The pressure group’s success will largely depend on how much pressure they can bring to bear on the real selectorate and the amount of pressure is synonymous with what benefits can be offered to the real selectorate to switch allegiance/revert to a national referendum.

Can that potential benefit beat the current benefit? I have doubts.

Coupled with my reservations about a national referendum producing what the pressure group wants, my opinion is that the Premier has realised it’s a relatively safe gamble to do an about face.

Finally, to clarify I’m not anti-gambling and as an expat I’m not even a member of the nominal selectorate. I am pro-information though.

Anthony Donaghy