Latest Independence initiative is another lost opportunity
Of course, Iran’s quest for the development of a nuclear power infrastructure (and the widespread suspicion that Tehran wants far more than just a nuclear capability which will allow it to reap the benefits of cheap energy) concerns other nations aside from the United States.
There are fears throughout the international community that what Iran really wants is the capability to develop a stockpile of nuclear weapons, a so-called Persian hydrogen bomb.
In the wake of the Anglo-American invasion and occupation of neighbouring Iraq and the longstanding open secret that the state of Israel almost certainly has nuclear weapons, Iran’s fundamentalist Islamic leader has recently lashed out at both the West and the Jewish state in apocalyptic terms.
Ever since Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic revolution in the late 1970s, there has been deep-seated hostility between the Jewish state and the fundamentalist leadership of Iran (prior to 1979, Israel enjoyed longstanding diplomatic, trade and tourism ties with a then secular Iran).
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad recently called for the destruction of Israel and its Jewish population, saying they should be dispersed throughout Europe. In view of this ongoing brinkmanship with Israel and Iran’s post-revolutionary support of the Palestinian people’s struggle for a state of their own, it perhaps comes as no real surprise that Tehran’s long-term strategic goal is to develop a nuclear weapons capability.
It must also never be forgotten that apart from its mortal enemy, the state of Israel, and increasingly the United States, which Tehran must now must view as a potential enemy, Iran itself is surrounded by nuclear armed states. These include Russia in the north, India and Pakistan in the south and China in the East.
Iran, this nation of some 67 million people, is not without aspirations of becoming a regional power in its own right. And Tehran realises that a nuclear arsenal would propel Iran a long way towards attaining this goal.
The United States’ concern over the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran is, first and foremost, tied to its wish to keep its major ally in the Middle East, the state of Israel, as the leading military power in the region. That would almost certainly cease to be the case if a nuclear armed Iran becomes a reality.
Certainly, an Iran that boasted a stockpile of nuclear weapons would well be on its way to becoming a regional power, dominating the neighbouring Arab states and their oil reserves (Arab-Persian enmity dates back thousands of years and despite the fact both peoples have shared the Islamic religion since the time of Mohammed, this historic hatred has never lessened).
In fact, Iran’s quest to become a nuclear power did not begin with the current rule of the Mullahs and the rise of a non-party, theocratic Islamic state. The Iran ruled by the Shah had ambitions of becoming a nuclear armed state. Already heavily armed by the United States, the Shah began Iran’s nuclear programme but accrued considerably less criticism from Washington as he was considered an indispensable Western ally.
Such perceived double-standards are now being exploited by the Tehran leadership. Why, they argue, should only US client states be given the latitude to embark on nuclear programmes? Why, if the United States is serious about wanting a nuclear free Middle East, is pressure not put on Israel about its nuclear capability?
It is clear that when it comes to a country acquiring nuclear power status, it is a question of who you are friends with. When India exploded its first nuclear bomb, it was subjected to US condemnation and economic sanctions (at the time the Cold War was raging and India was aligned with the Soviet Union).
But just recently, during a trip to India by President Bush, American nuclear technology was given to the Indian nuclear programme amid American-Indian declarations of friendship. Likewise Pakistan boasts a nuclear capability developed by a rogue scientist who was subsequently caught selling nuclear technology on the international black market (Iran was one of his clients). Nevertheless Pakistan is not subjected to American condemnation because it plays the role of a major ally in America’s War on Terror.
The French were the last major western power to conduct above-ground nuclear tests and did so in the face of massive world protests, especially in the South Pacific. There were concern over nuclear fallout and pollution affecting the nations in the area. France went so far as to sink a Greenpeace boat in New Zealand, killing one protester in the process, when it attempted to keep an eye on the French tests.
Even in the past, if nations were considered friendly to the West, their nuclear programme did not meet with many objections from the US. Apartheid South Africa had a well developed nuclear programme, complete with a secret test site in the Kalahari Desert.
And it has long been suspected that South Africa, with Israeli help, tested a nuclear bomb in the area of the Indian and South Atlantic oceans. An American satellite picked up and recorded a light signal which American officials and scientists concluded was that of an explosion of nuclear device with a yield of about two to four kilotons. South African naval ships were detected in the area.
No, that is not the case at all. All I have tried to do is point out that membership to the exclusive Nuclear Club doesn’t necessarily depend on what you know in the field of atomic research but on who you know (and it’s not just the US that turns a blind eye to its regional allies’ nuclear ambitions; for instance, China gave nod-and-wink permission to North Korea to embark on its nuclear programme).
Those countries that do possess nuclear weapons don’t have any superior moral right to such arsenals. Nor can they always be expected to better control the use of such weapons based on their political system or their respect for international law. At any time a nation may depart from such standards and act in defence of what it considers to be its best interests.
For example, during the Falklands War it was speculated that if Britain faced defeat in its efforts to regain the Islands than it was prepared to use nuclear weapons against Argentina. Whether that was true or not we won’t find out until a hundred years or so from now when all of the documents relating to that war are declassified.
But nuclear weapons, like all other sophisticated weapons systems, are open to abuse. Unless mankind ever bans warfare as a means of settling its differences, it is likely that at some point in the future the world could face thermo-nuclear destruction as a result of man’s ever present-genius to develop increasingly powerful super weapons to obliterate those he considers to be the enemy.