directly to prison facilities and operations: 1: Overall the prison-related aspects of the criminal justice system (prisons, probation, courts, escorts etc.) operate in substantially the same manner as in 1992 when Casemates was still in operation.

The transition to a new correctional mode of operation built around Westgate replacing Casemates appears to have been poorly planned and executed. An opportunity to make great improvements was lost and now-ingrained bad habits will make the essential turnaround difficult.

2: The state of facilities and equipment, except at Westgate, is rather poor.

The east-end operations are inadequately equipped, the facilities are in an unsatisfactory state of repair, and the condition of many inmate and staff furnishings is unacceptable. The staff don't have personal portable alarms, visibility is inadequate, surveillance equipment is non-existent, and even the radios don't work. This contributes significantly to staff's perception that they are unsafe, especially on night patrol.

3: Westgate also is inadequately equipped partly due to decisions that were made to cut certain equipment capabilities during construction. For example, there is no internal CCTV surveillance, and the perimeter is not secure. Some crucial equipment that is in place is undependable.

4: Maximum security procedures are inadequate. There is no Institutional Emergency Response Team or action plan. Staff are not trained to deal with potential contingencies such as hostage-takings. The police have no special relationship with Prisons so they're not prepared either. Preparing to deal with emergencies is a fundamental requirement of any prison administration.

5: The maximum security operation at Westgate is inadequate for accommodating "dangerous'' inmates. The control post is left open, inmates circulate in the hall surrounding the post, etc. There are only 10 maximum security inmates and 2 remand inmates accommodated in the 32 call maximum security unit.

6: Many medium and minimum security measures also are inadequate. For example, the fact that there is too little for the inmates to do diminishes indirect security, as inmates who are not kept busy require extra direct security.

Security staff have too many idle inmates "in their faces'', this causes stress. The practice of accommodating minimum security inmates in Westgate so that they can work outside the perimeter wall generates unnecessary traffic and expense, and provides an easy access route for contraband. On the other hand, some medium and even minimum security measures may be overkill. The process of frequently counting inmates and practices for detailed movement control are similar to those in the maximum security environment and may be unnecessary.

7: Staff training is infrequent and entirely inadequate, and is not job-focused. There needs to be more formal development of how prison facilities are to be operated before training can be effective. (Some genetic training, such as self-defence and emergency response procedures could probably be delivered to prison Officers by the police and by other prison jurisdictions. The Police have indicated that they would be pleased to cooperate.) 8: The principal information of the Department of Prisons are inadequate.

Designing and managing operations based on solid data does not appear to have been a Prisons tradition. While some aspects of an improved information system are being developed, much of it appears to being designed to merely automate what is being done now manually. This would not be an appropriate way to modernise...

9: While there is not enough time to investigate this matter in depth, the methods used for procuring goods and managing Prison's inventory, the inmate canteen, the laundry and so on appear to be excessively costly. A partial central stores is maintained at Headquarters, and pick-ups from it were, in February 1996, being made daily. Another warehouse is located in the west-end complex, adjacent to the Day Release Centre. Some thought could be given to partially privatizing operations like the canteen, stores, and the inmate laundry.

10: The issue of managing costs and especially cost-effectiveness is not ingrained in the Prison's culture, even among many senior personnel...

(a) It appears that the present shift scheduling system is designed in part to accommodate the personal preferences of Officers and may be inherently inefficient. There are a few days when Officers turn up for work but are "spare''. They are at work mainly because of their obligation to work an average 40 hours per week, not because their attendance was scheduled to fill a post. There is no organised means of redeploying the "spare'' officers to maximise value for money although they are undoubtedly assigned to do useful work while on the job.

(b) Staff scheduling is done manually and is far too complicated to be done well this way. Computer software has been purchased to help with staff scheduling but has not been implemented.

(c) Overtime pay costs at least 1.5 times more than regular pay, but statistics prepared by MSD indicate that 80% or so of overtime pay is at double time and higher rates.

11: It would be preferable to minimise the extent to which staff are rotated on shifts. This would help to promote stability and continuity in the relationships of staff with inmates and in the day-to-day operations of the prisons.

12: There are problems with the functioning and performance of the top management group of the Prisons Department.

13: There are also problems with the functioning and performance of the remaining staff...

14: There is a pervasive belief at all staff levels that the main problem has been and still is understaffing. It is argued that Westgate is bigger and has more buildings spread over a larger area than Casemates. It is also argued that, since Westgate was designed to be operated with about 118 staff, it cannot be made to work properly without a substantial injection of additional staff.

15: Part of the perceived understaffing problem is caused by more sick leave being taken now than was previously the case. At about 17 days per officer per year the amount being taken is about twice what would be considered acceptable in other organisations. It requires at least 15 person-years merely to replace officers on sick leave. Each 5 days of sick leave per officer per year translates to roughly 41 person-years of "understaffing''. Sick leave was expected to diminish after the new Westgate prison was opened and Casemates, where working conditions were substandard, was closed. Instead, the opposite has happened. Just after the fact-finding activities of this study, Management Services completed an analysis of the amount of sick leave taken per employee.

It is clear that, during the last three years, the amount of sick leave being taken has almost doubled. Most of this increase took place in 1995, the year immediately following the opening of Westgate. The amount of sick leave being taken may have been for one of the following reasons: (a) An unusual number of maternity leaves and other traditional reasons for being absent from work.

(b) Stressful working conditions causing stress-related illness.

Most officers believe that increased overtime and other ramifications of the understanding of prison operations has made them overworked and overstressed, which in turn has made many of them sick. This, they explain, is why more sick leave is being taken.

(c) New rules that were instituted at about the same time that Westgate was occupied.

Staff are entitled to up to 63 days of sick leave annually. Prior to November 1994, all sick leave had to be certified. After November 1994, officers became entitled to up to 8 days of uncertified sick leave per year. A MSD analysis conducted for this study indicated that the 172 prison officers took 632.5 days of uncertified leave in 1995, an average of 3.7 days per officer. They took another 2306 days of certified leave, up from the 2126 days of certified leave 182 officers took in 1994. In other words, the amount of both certified and uncertified leave being taken per officer is increasing.

The problem could perhaps be reduced by some fairly simple changes in sick leave entitlements and their administration. Care should be taken that savings that would accrue to the Prisons by having Bermuda's medical system certify all "sick leave'' do not become extra costs for Bermuda's medical care system. Perhaps a simple solution would be for the Department of Prisons to view itself as an insurance company financing sick leave benefits. A private insurance company would normally insists on the right to investigate any claim, and would establish audit practices to ensure that its pay-outs were less than the insurance premiums it was charging. It would probably have some type of sick leave inspector who would audit some sick leave claims the day they were called-in, this could be a phone call or a short visit. If professional advice was necessary, the company would arrange to have an appropriate medical examination conducted.

A typical officer is probably not available for work on his or her shift for 63.35 of the 261 paid days per year. That's about 26% of the time -- one day in four! Theoretically then, at any given time an average of three quarters of staff are on the job and one quarter of staff are replacing staff who are absent! Actually, when staff work "unsociable hours'' (more than half the shift is after 4:00 p.m.) they are entitled to an extra half hour of holidays per shift worked. This is 1/16th of the time that they would otherwise be available for work. For someone on afternoon shift who would otherwise work 1971 days per year, another 111 become holidays and the days worked per year reduces to 186.

The Bermuda Department of Prisons is ostensibly in the "corrections'' business. That is, its first priority is to "correct'' inmates that the courts sentence to incarceration. A logical consequence of this is that all activities in the prisons should be built around a core of correctional activities. At present the reverse is true -- correcting processes, to the extent that they exist at all, are built around a core of security operations.